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Abstract—Static data-flow analysis has proven its effectiveness
in assessing security of applications. One major challenge it faces
is scalability to large software. This issue is even exacerbated
when additional limitations on computing and storage resources
are imposed, as is the case for mobile devices. In such cases the
analysis is performed on a conventional computer. This poses two
problems. First, a man-in-the-middle attack can tamper with
an analyzed application. So once on the mobile device, what
guarantees that the actual version is not corrupt. Second, the
analysis itself might be broken leading to an erroneous result.
As a solution, we present DCert a tool for checking and certifying
data-flow properties that consists of two components: a (heavy-
weight) analyzer and a (lightweight) checker. The analyzer is
deployed on a conventional computer. It verifies the conformance
of a given application to a specified policy and generates a
certificate attesting the validity of the analysis result. It suffices
then for the checker, on a mobile device, to perform a linear
pass in the application size to validate or refute the certificate as
well as the policy. This allows us to separate the verification
and the checking process while ensuring a trust relationship
between them via the certificate. We describe DCert and report
on experimental results obtained for real-world applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices are playing a more and more important
part in daily life, they are used to perform several tasks
and store a variety of information: personal, financial, in-
dustrial, etc. Therefore, security and privacy are becoming
major concerns. While the security model on Android already
provides resource protection via permissions, it also incurs
some rigidity on user choices. For example, a photo app
obviously requires the CAMERA permission but also might
require the INTERNET permission to receive and display
some ads. A possible malicious behaviour of that app is to
send taken pictures through the Internet without user consent.
Android model allows us either to grant or deny permissions
which might impede app normal functionality. Ideally, we
want to know if there is a link between the CAMERA and the
INTERNET permission. Based on that, we decide whether or
not to install the app. Static taint analysis permits to check the
presence of data-flow paths from the API function for taking
pictures (source), to the API function for sending files through
the Internet (sink). It has proven its effectiveness in assessing
the security of Android applications [1], [5], [11], [13], [14],
[17], [24].
A main issue with static analysis is scalability. This problem
is even exacerbated when additional limitations on computing
and storage resources are imposed, as is the case for mobile
devices. In case of the previously mentioned tools, the analysis
is performed on a conventional computer. This poses two
problems. First, a man-in-the-middle attack can tamper with
an analyzed application. So once on the mobile device, what
guarantees that the actual version is not corrupt. Second, the
analysis itself might be broken leading to an erroneous result.
We present a Proof-Carrying-Code inspired solution [20]
that advises the usage of a certificate as an audit for the
accountability of the static analysis algorithm. It consists of
splitting the analysis process between two parties: a (heavy-
weight) analyzer and a (lightweight) checker. The analyzer is
deployed on a conventional computer. It verifies the confor-
mance of a given application to a specified (data-flow) property
and generates a certificate attesting the validity of the analysis
result. It suffices then for the checker, on a mobile device,
to perform a linear pass in the application size to validate
or refute the certificate as well as the property. This allows
us to separate the verification and the checking process while
ensuring a trust relationship between them via the certificate.
We have implemented our approach in a tool called DCert
(Droid Certifier) and successfully applied it to real-world
applications. In what follows, we describe its main ingredients
and report on experimental results.
II. DCERT IN ACTION
We illustrate the functionalities of DCert’s main ingredients
through an example. Consider the simple code in Figure 1
as part of an Android application. To ease the presenta-
tion, we omit irrelevant details. We have the root procedure
foo which makes call to function bar which, in turn,
calls procedures getId, Send and getNumber. Function
getId reads the device identifier using the API method
getDeviceId at line 4. Similarly, function getNumber
returns the number of the actual phone via API method
getLine1Number at line 4. Finally, procedure Send is
used to send the string it takes as argument as an SMS via
API method sendTextMessage at line 5. Both methods
getDeviceId and getLine1Number represent sources
and sendTextMessage is a sink. We want to verify that
the app does not leak information from certain sources to
certain sinks and generate a checkable certificate attesting the
outcome. For this we have three ingredients.
A. Property
The first step in our approach is to specify data paths
that should not be present in the considered application. Let
us use id and num to respectively refer to the sources
getDeviceId and getLine1Number. We also write sms
for the sink sendTextMessage. We want to express the
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1 String foo()
2 {
3 String x = bar();
4 return x;
5 }
1 String getId()
2 {
3 TelephonyManager tm = ...; // get manager
4 String x = tm.getDeviceId();
5 return x;
6 }
1 String bar()
2 {
3 String x = getId();
4 Send(x);
5 String y = getNumber();
6 return y;
7 }
1 String getNumber(String x)
2 {
3 TelephonyManager tm = ...; // get manager
4 String x = tm.getLine1Number();
5 return x;
6 }
1 void Send(String x)
2 {
3 String num = "..."; // destination phone number
4 SmsManager SM = ...; // get manager
5 SM.sendTextMessage(num, null, x, null, null);
6 }
Fig. 1: Simple Java example illustrating potential data flows from sources to sinks. Method getDeviceId is an
Android method for obtaining the device identifier, method getLine1Number permits to obtain the phone number and
sendTextMessage allows to send text messages (SMS).
Fig. 2: DCert main components.
absence of information leak from sources to sinks in procedure
foo. This is done via:
foo : ¬(sms,id),¬(sms,num)
Each pair (x, y) expresses a data-flow from x to y and the
symbol ¬ represents a negation. Hence, the policy says that
there should be no path reading the phone ID and sending it
via SMS (in the first pair) and the same applies to the phone
number (second pair). If no property is specified, the implicit
property (by default) is that no data-flow from any source to
any sink is allowed. The next step is to analyse the app to
verify the validity of the specified property.
B. Analyzer
Figure 2 illustrates the key parts of DCert. The analyzer
takes an app and a property as input and answers whether
the property is satisfied by the app, and eventually outputs
a certificate corroborating the outcome of the analysis. The
analyzer implements an inter-procedural data-flow analysis.
For each function, it computes a summary which consists of
a set of pairs (x, y) expressing the existence of a data-flow
from y to x. A summary of a given procedure only includes
elements visible outside of it. Hence, local variables will not
appear in a summary. During the analysis, when a function
is invoked from another one, its summary is used instead
of re-analysing it. This process is iterated until a fix-point
is reached. For illustration, consider Figure 3. It shows the
summary computed for the different methods of our previous
example (Figure 1) at each iteration. Initially (iteration 0), all
function summaries are empty.
After iteration 1, empty summaries are still associated
with procedures foo and bar, however, summaries for pro-
cedures getId, getNumber and Send are updated. The
symbol ret models the return value of a method. Hence,
summaries (ret, id) and (ret, num), respectively, express flows
of the phone identifier (in getId) and the phone number
(in getNumber) to a return statement. Similarly, (sms, x)
expresses the presence of a data-flow from the argument x
of procedure Send to the sink sms.
After iteration 2, the summary for procedure bar is updated
as summaries associated with its callees changed in the previ-
ous step (iteration 1), meaning potential new data paths. For
example, (sms, id) is due to the path Send ← x ← getId in
procedure bar, when procedures Send and getId are substituted
with their summaries.
Finally, the last iteration (3) updates the summary for foo
by just propagating bar’s summary. At this state a fix-point is
reached and no further changes will be induced. The presence
Iteration
0 1 2 3
foo: - - - (sms, id), (ret, num)
bar: - - (sms, id), (ret, num) (sms, id), (ret, num)
getId: - (ret, id) (ret, id) (ret, id)
getNumber: - (ret, num) (ret, num) (ret, num)
Send: - (sms, x) (sms, x) (sms, x)
Fig. 3: Iterative computation of function summaries. A pair
(x, y) models a data-flow from y to x.
of (sms, id) in the summary associated with foo implies the
violation of one rule, namely ¬(sms, id), but the other rule,
¬(sms, num), is not violated.
The final map (iteration 3) represents the certificate. It will
be returned by the analyser together with a report indicating
rules from the policy that are violated.
C. Checker
Now the question is how can a client of the analysis trust
its claim? The analysis might contain errors or, even worst, an
attacker can claim app safety without applying the analysis at
all. For this, the computed map will serve as a certificate. To
test its validity, we just need to locally check that the summary
of each method is valid by assuming the validity of the
summaries of its callees. For example, assuming the summary
for bar is {(sms, id), (ret, num)}, the summary for foo must be
{(sms, id), (ret, num)}, which is the case, otherwise we have
an inconsistency. This is performed by the checker which takes
as input a certificate (computed map) a property and an app,
and answers whether the certificate is valid. In addition, if the
certificate is valid, it also verifies whether the certificate entails
the property.
Certificate checking is lighter than certificate generation as
we do not need to compute a fix-point. Instead, it is performed
in a single pass. It has a linear complexity in the number of
map entries (functions) and a constant space complexity as we
just perform checks without generating information that need
to be stored.
D. About Certificate Resilience
Let us test the resilience of the previously generated certifi-
cate with respect to possible tampering scenarios.
We first omit (sms, id) from the entries corresponding to
both foo and bar. While this will not be detected when check-
ing foo as consistency is not broken, it will be detected when
checking bar. Indeed, consistency of the certificate implies
that (sms, id) must be associated with foo as a consequence
of (ret, id) and (sms, x) associated with getId and Send
respectively.
Let us have a more extreme scenario where we remove
(−, id) from all entries. This case is also detected as id refers
to the API method getDeviceId which represents a seed for
the analysis. Hence, consistency implies that (x, id) must be
associated with getId as it directly invokes getDeviceId.
How about suppressing all the entries? Our analysis will
detect this case as the first step in the certificate integrity check
is to make sure that all methods used in the program have
entries in the map.
Now, let us modify the code but preserve the certificate as
it is, sot that it does not exhibit the changes. Assume we add
the call Send(y) just before the return statement at line 6 in
procedure bar (Figure 1). While the checker does not detect
inconsistencies with respect to the entry of procedure foo,
it finds out that the certificate is no longer valid with respect
to the entry of bar. Indeed, (sms, num) should have been
present in bar’s entry.
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
DCert is written in Python and uses Androguard1 as front-
end for parsing and decompiling Android applications. It
accepts Android applications in bytecode format (APK), so
it does not require source code. One can simply download
an app from a store of choice and analyse it. As mentioned
previously, DCert has two main components: Analyser and
Checker.
The analyser runs on a conventional desktop computer. It
takes as input an app and a property and returns, as output,
a report about the analysis result together with a certificate.
Concretely speaking, the property consists of a file containing
all sources and sinks that should be taken into account.
The checker accepts an application, a certificate and a
property as input, and answers whether the certificate is valid
with respect to the application taken as input. If the certificate
is valid, it also reports on whether the property is fulfilled. The
checker can run either on a mobile device or a conventional
machine. The mobile device version is provided as An android
app. As it is written is Python, we use kivy2 to facilitate its
deployment.
Real-world Applications.: We were able to successfully
apply DCert to two popular and largely used applications:
Facebook and FacebookMessenger. We downloaded both
directly from the Google Play store3. The two apps are of
decent size with each of them containing more than 6000
methods.
In our experiments, we used a typical Linux desktop to run
the verifier and a Samsung J5 mobile phone ( Exynox7870
Octa 1.6GHz processor, 2GB RAM), running Android, to host
the checker. We analysed both apps with respect the default
property, i.e., find all data leaks between any source and any
sink.
First, we call the analyser to verify the validity of the
property and to generate a certificate. In a second step, the
checker is invoked to check the generated certificate. As a
result, no leaks where found in both apps, and the checker was
able to confirm the validity of the generated certificate. The
whole running time for the checker is around 39 minutes for
the Facebook app and 44 minutes for FacebookMessenger.
While runtime difference is huge between running the checker
on a mobile device and on a desktop computer, these results
1https://github.com/androguard
2https://kivy.org
3https://play.google.com/store/apps
are encouraging given the size of the considered applications
and the limitations of mobile devices. Moreover, we identified
regions in our code and in the used front-end that we can
optimise to reduce execution time.
IV. RELATED WORK
Android security is an active area of investigation, many
tools for analyzing security aspects of Android have emerged.
Some rely on dynamic analysis [4], [10], [21], [25], [26]. Other
tools are based on static analysis [1], [3], [7], [8], [12], [15],
[16]. We are interested in the last category (static analysis) as
our aim is to certify the absence of bad behaviors. Our work
is a complement to these tools as we are not only interested in
analyzing applications, but also to return a verifiable certificate
attesting the validity of the analysis result.
The idea of associating proofs with code was initially
proposed by Necula under the moniker Proof-Carrying Code
(PCC) [19], [20]. It was then used to support resource policies
for mobile code [2], [6]. Furthermore, Desmet et al. presented
an implementation of PCC for the .NET platform [9]. While
the tool EviCheck [22], [23] is also based on a similar idea and
targets Android, it is unable to analyse data-flow properties.
Cassandra also applies PCC to Android [18]. Their approach
proposes a type system to precisely track information flows.
While precision is an advantage, it is hard to assess the prac-
ticability of their approach as no experiments involving real-
world applications are reported. Our approach is applicable to
real-world large applications.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
We presented DCert a tool for analysing and certifying data-
flows, inspired by the proof-carrying-code paradigm. DCert
allows to analyse applications on mobile devices by splitting
the certification process between two components: a (heavy-
weight) analyzer and a (lightweight) checker, and using a
certificate as a mechanism for ensuring trust between the two
parties. We described DCert’s implementation and reported
on experimental results obtained for real-world applications.
DCert represents an outlook for future app stores, where
apps are equipped with contracts (policies) and checkable
evidence (certificate). We are not aware of any other tool that
implements a similar certification scheme and is scalable to
real-world applications.
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